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PERPETUATING INEQUALITY
BY TAXING WEALTH
Goldburn P. Maynard Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
In the decade since Michael Graetz and Ian Shapiro wrote the definitive
account of the death tax repeal saga of the late 1990s and early 2000s,
Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Fight Over Taxing Inherited Wealth,1 the
federal estate tax has proven to be surprisingly resilient. After a one-year
hiatus and a two-year temporary reprieve, the levy was made permanent
again in 2013.2 At a time when wealth inequality is a topic of major
concern, the federal estate tax remains the only levy that is meant
specifically to combat the concentration of wealth in the hands of the few.
It is also the most progressive part of the tax system, as its burden is borne
by the wealthiest Americans.
The survival of the estate tax seemingly fits into America’s newfound
interest in fighting wealth inequality. Just last year, Thomas Piketty’s book,
Capital in the Twenty-First Century,3 became a best seller and prompted
robust discussions about wealth disparities. Against this backdrop, it
appears that Graetz and Shapiro’s warning about “[t]he broader antitax
force . . . marching forward in Washington and in the great heartland”4
proved incorrect largely because of the Great Recession.
That is until we take a closer look. The current version of the estate tax
is a shadow of its former self. According to the Department of Treasury, in
2014, the estate tax raised $19.3 billion, or 0.6 percent of total federal
revenue over $3 trillion.5 That figure historically stood at between 1 and 2
* Assistant Professor of Law, Brandeis School of Law, University of Louisville. I would
like to thank Tim Kuhner and the participants of the Fordham Law Review symposium
entitled You Are What You Tax for their comments, questions, and suggestions. I would also
like to thank Helen Cooper and James Russell for their invaluable research assistance. For
an overview of the symposium, see Mary Louise Fellows, Grace Heinecke & Linda Sugin,
Foreword: We Are What We Tax, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2413 (2016).
1. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER
TAXING INHERITED WEALTH (2005).
2. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 302, 124 Stat. 3296, 3302.
3. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer
trans., 2014).
4. GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 11.
5. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, RECEIPTS BY SOURCE, http://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Documents/2014%20Receipts%20by%20Source.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5L53-LJZW].
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percent of federal revenue.6 Due to increasing exemptions, in 2013, slightly
less than 0.2 percent of all estates owed any estate tax at all.7 Further,
although the marginal tax rate is 40 percent, the average effective tax rate is
less than 20 percent.8
There is no shortage of proposals to “fix” the estate tax by making it both
more far-reaching and meaningful.9 While these proposals are reasonable,
and even modest, they have failed to confront an important part of Graetz
and Shapiro’s book: stories trump science.10 Fittingly, in their defense of
the Death Tax Repeal Act of 2015,11 two influential members of the
Republican conference focused on a successful storyline drafted and revised
in the battles over repeal: the estate tax as an impediment to the American
dream framed in terms of the family and the hope of future generations.12
This Article attempts to correct this shortcoming in the progressive
argument by returning narrative to its central place in the estate tax debate.
Drawing on psychological insights, I hope to underscore the difficulty of
the effort to preserve progressive taxation and combat wealth inequality.
To this end, this Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a brief
historical overview of the estate tax, including the death tax repeal
movement, which gained strength in the 1990s. Common estate tax
planning techniques also are discussed to show that there is substantial
room for planning and avoidance of the tax.
Part II describes how the current estate tax impasse between repeal
advocates and proponents actually results in a weaker estate tax. By
focusing on Graegin13 loans and defined value clauses, I show that
congressional inaction results in ever-widening loopholes. Because the
6. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., HISTORY, PRESENT LAW,
ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAX SYSTEM 28 (Comm. Print 2015).
Also worth noting,
The percentage of decedents liable for the estate tax grew throughout the postwar
era reaching a peak in the mid-1970s. The substantial revision to the estate tax in
the mid-1970s and subsequent further modifications in 1981 reduced the
percentage of decedents liable for the estate tax to less than 1 percent in the late
1980s. The percentage of decedents liable for the estate tax increased from year to
year from 1988 through 2000. The increases in the unified credit enacted in 2001
and 2010 (and made permanent in 2013) reduced substantially the percentage of
decedents’ estates liable for the estate tax.
Id. at 24.
7. Id. at 25.
8. TAX POLICY CTR., TABLE T13-0020: CURRENT LAW DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS ESTATE
AND NET ESTATE TAX BY SIZE OF GROSS ESTATE, 2013, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
numbers/Content/PDF/T13-0020.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MFR-4TZY].
9. See infra Part III.
10. GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 221–38. But see Paul L. Caron & James R.
Repetti, The Estate Tax Non-Gap: Why Repeal a “Voluntary” Tax?, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 153 (2009) (undermining the characterization of the estate tax as voluntary).
11. Death Tax Repeal Act of 2015, H.R. 1105, 114th Cong. (2015).
12. John Thune & Bill Flores, Time for the Estate Tax to Die, USA TODAY (Apr. 16,
2015, 6:56 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/04/16/death-tax-abolishthune-column/25816117/ [https://perma.cc/VB8Q-RP86].
13. Graegin v. Comm’r, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 387 (1988). See infra Part II for a detailed
discussion of Graegin v. Commissioner.
AND
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debates have focused on the right of the family to retain its wealth, judges
increasingly have tolerated efforts to lower estate taxes, even when such
planning interferes with the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS or “the
Service”) collection efforts.
Part III surveys proposals to make the federal estate tax more robust.
The proposals present creative solutions to plugging loopholes and fixing
the estate tax. However, I argue that the proposals have not confronted the
underlying narratives that estate tax abolitionists have advanced. I use
System Justification Theory to explain the entrenched and persistent nature
of these narratives. Finally, I conclude by suggesting some ways forward.
I. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL ESTATE TAX
AND COMMON PLANNING TECHNIQUES
What usually is referred to as the federal estate tax is technically three
levies working in conjunction: the estate tax,14 the gift tax,15 and the tax on
generation-skipping transfers16 (GST). In order to understand how the
estate tax became a part of the conflict over progressive taxation in the
United States, some historical perspective is necessary.
A. History
The federal taxation system in the nineteenth century mainly consisted of
indirect taxes, such as import duties and regressive excise taxes on alcohol
and tobacco.17 As the nation began to establish itself as a world power,
these taxes provided inadequate funds to meet the increasing revenue needs
of the federal government.18 This regressive taxation, which burdened the
working classes disproportionately, along with the rise of the holding
company and the “unprecedented number of mergers in the manufacturing
sector,” resulted in wealth becoming increasingly concentrated in the hands
of the few.19
Progressives continued to press for both a progressive income tax and a
tax on inheritances to decrease wealth concentration.20 This eventually led
to the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment and the enactment of the

14. I.R.C. §§ 2001–2209 (2012).
15. Id. §§ 2501–2524.
16. Id. §§ 2601–2663. Special valuation rules relating to these taxes are included in
sections 2701 to 2704. Section 2801 contains rules regarding gifts from expatriates. Id. §
2801.
17. Ajay K. Mehrotra, Envisioning the Modern American Fiscal State: Progressive-Era
Economists and the Intellectual Foundations of the U.S. Income Tax, 52 UCLA L. REV.
1793, 1803 (2005).
18. Id. at 1809.
19. Darien B. Jacobson et al., The Estate Tax: Ninety Years and Counting, in INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., SOI BULL. 118, 120 (2007), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/ninetyestate.
pdf [https://perma.cc/74V4-PERX].
20. Mehrotra, supra note 17, at 1798 (contending that a particular group of academics
helped to bring about a radical transformation in the U.S. public finance system). For a
comprehensive account of the forces that brought about the progressive income tax, see
generally id.
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modern estate tax.21 The estate tax was passed as a part of a comprehensive
tax reform package in 1916.22 The First World War led to a sharp reduction
of tariff revenue at a time when the government needed funds for its
military buildup.23 The tax package transformed the income tax “into the
foremost instrument of federal taxation,” imposed a significant tax on
corporate profits, and included an excess-profits tax.24
The estate tax was not yet on firm footing, however. In the 1920s, the
Calvin Coolidge Administration attempted to repeal the levy.25 Between
1925 and 1928, led by Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon, the
Administration argued that inheritance taxation undermined the nation’s
economy and was the providence of the states and not the federal
government.26 In the end, this effort was unsuccessful, as it was opposed
by respected tax experts who argued that the estate tax helped lower taxes
for those who actually earned wealth.27
Although the estate tax was a revenue raiser, this was not the only reason
for its enactment; the federal government also wished to redistribute the tax
burden and reduce the concentrations of wealth.28 Because the levy could
be avoided by giving away property during life, a gift tax eventually was
added, becoming a permanent fixture of the wealth transfer system in
1932.29 These progressive impulses influenced tax policy through the end
President Franklin Roosevelt viewed wealth
of World War II.30
accumulation as a distinctly social phenomenon.31 For Roosevelt, the
wealthy owed a debt to the communities from which they drew their
fortunes, and the control of an ever-widening spectrum of industry by a
limited number of wealthy individuals stood in contrast to fundamental
American values of competition and civil society.32
After World War II, progressive ideals held less sway in tax policy, and
the estate tax remained essentially the same until 1976. That year,
Congress unified the estate and gift taxes into a single rate to combat
21. Id. at 1856.
22. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 200–212, 39 Stat. 756, 777–80.
23. W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA 57–60 (2d ed. 2004).
24. Id. at 62.
25. For a more comprehensive discussion of this repeal effort, see M. Susan Murnane,
Andrew Mellon’s Unsuccessful Attempt to Repeal Estate Taxes, TAXANALYSTS (Aug. 22,
2005), http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsf/ArtWeb/672746F8E859EA778525709000
06AC21?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/244Q-NX94].
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. David Joulfaian, The Federal Estate Tax: History, Law, and Economics 1-1 to 1-2
(June 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1579829 [https://perma.cc/TN4Y-M738].
29. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 501, 47 Stat. 169, 245. The gift tax was first
introduced in 1924, but repealed in 1926. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 319–324, 43
Stat. 253, 313–16; Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1200, 44 Stat. 9, 125 (repealing the gift
tax).
30. BROWNLEE, supra note 23, at 5–6.
31. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress on Tax Revision (June 19,
1935), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15088 [https://perma.cc/GL5Q-L8J4].
32. Id.
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individuals giving away their wealth during their lifetime to take advantage
of the lower gift tax rate, therefore avoiding the higher estate tax rate.33
The generation-skipping tax was also added in 1976 in response to tax
planning that allowed a decedent’s children to avoid paying taxes on their
death.34 In 1981, Congress lowered the estate tax rate, made the marital
deduction more taxpayer friendly, and raised the exemption from $175,000
to $600,000.35
The 1990s saw the rise of the estate tax abolitionists, who presented a
sustained challenge to the policy of reducing wealth concentration. This
was a broad coalition of outsiders, activists, and legislators who gained
strength after the Republican takeover of the House in 1994. The
abolitionists almost achieved their goals at the end of the century. In 1999
and 2000, Congress passed bills to permanently repeal the estate tax, but
President Bill Clinton vetoed them both.36 In 2001, after efforts for
permanent repeal failed, President George W. Bush signed into law
sweeping changes to the estate tax.37 These changes further undermined
attempts to level wealth concentration. The estate tax rate was lowered to
45 percent, and the exemption increased incrementally between 2001 and
2009 to $3.5 million.38 The estate tax was then repealed in 2010, but was
scheduled to return in 2011 with a $1 million exemption.39
At the end of 2010, President Barack Obama reached a compromise with
Congress that further decreased the reach of the estate tax.40 The law,
which expired after two years, lowered the estate tax rate to 35 percent and
increased the exemption to $5 million.41 The temporary law necessitated
negotiations at the end of 2012. The President proposed a return to the $3.5
million exemption and the 45 percent rate.42 Finally, at the beginning of
2013, the estate tax again was made permanent, with the tax rate increased
to 40 percent and the $5 million exemption (indexed for inflation)
retained.43 This compromise ultimately left each side dissatisfied, as
abolitionists prefer a complete repeal, and progressives prefer lower
exemptions and a higher tax rate.
33. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001, 90 Stat. 1520.
34. Id. § 2006.
35. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, §§ 401–403, 95 Stat. 172,
299.
36. See Lizette Alvarez, President Vetoes Effort to Repeal Taxes on Estates, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 1, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/01/us/president-vetoes-effort-to-repealtaxes-on-estates.html [https://perma.cc/DF3P-F7HZ].
37. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 10716, §§ 501–581, 115 Stat. 38, 69–94.
38. Id. §§ 511, 521.
39. Id. §§ 521(b), 901.
40. See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 302, 124 Stat. 3296, 3302.
41. Id.
42. See Siobhan Hughes, Plan to Raise Estate Tax Divides Democrats, WALL STREET J.
(Nov. 30, 2012, 7:28 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324020804578
151430887301890 [https://perma.cc/BS5N-85UK].
43. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 101, 126 Stat. 2313,
2318 (2013).
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B. Common Estate Tax Planning Techniques
Ever since the inception of wealth transfer taxation, taxpayers and their
planners have found ways to minimize tax liability. Taxpayers have the
right to avoid, reduce, or minimize their taxes.44 To help explain why the
estate tax is so porous, I will describe two common estate tax planning
techniques.45
The Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust uses a combination of gift and
estate tax rules to avoid estate taxes and provide liquidity to the grantor’s
estate.46 Although the details can vary on the margins, the planning
technique is achieved as follows. The trust is funded with a life insurance
policy on the life of the grantor. The beneficiaries are family members of
the grantor. The trust is irrevocable, so it is considered a completed gift.
The insurance policy is now controlled by a trustee, and the grantor has no
control over it, so it is out of his estate.47 Because the insurance policy has
not been paid up, the gift of the policy is not substantial enough to trigger
tax implications.
To pay up the policy, the grantor transfers an amount equal to the annual
exclusion (currently $14,000) each year.48 These amounts are not eligible
for the exclusion unless they are present interests, which the beneficiary
could enjoy right away.49 To meet this requirement, the donor gives each
beneficiary a discretionary right to withdraw the amount for a few days.50
The yearly transfers continue for the life of the donor and can result in life
insurance policies valued at several million dollars. When the donor dies,
the value of the policy is not included in his estate because he did not
possess “any of the incidents of ownership.”51

44. See Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465
(1935) (“Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is
not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a
patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.”).
45. More sophisticated planning techniques can yield more significant tax savings. For
example, Mitt Romney’s estate planning became an issue after his tax returns showed that he
had gifted his heirs $100 million tax free. He used an Intentionally Defective Grantor Trust
(IDGT). Jesse Drucker, Romney ‘I Dig It’ Trust Gives Heirs Triple Benefit, BLOOMBERG
(Sept. 27, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-09-27/romney-idig-it-trust-gives-heirs-triple-benefit [https://perma.cc/R2AX-H4VW]; see also Dwight
Drake, Transitioning the Family Business, 83 WASH. L. REV. 123, 127–28 (2008) (describing
several advanced estate planning techniques and why they may be inadvisable for family
businesses).
46. See William S. Huff, The Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust, 38 ARK. L. REV. 139,
139–41 (1984).
47. See I.R.C. § 2042(2) (2012) (providing that life insurance proceeds are only included
in the gross estate of a decedent if she has incidents of ownership over it).
48. See id. § 2503(b)(1) (setting the annual exclusion, to be adjusted to inflation by
multiples of $1000). The exclusion is currently $14,000. Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B.
623.
49. Fondren v. Comm’r, 324 U.S. 18, 20 (1945).
50. This power has come to be known as a Crummey power after the taxpayer who
brought the case that upheld the technique. Crummey v. Comm’r, 397 F.2d 82, 86 (9th Cir.
1968).
51. I.R.C. § 2042(2).
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Family-limited entities also are used commonly to move wealth from one
generation to another while minimizing estate taxes.52 This technique relies
on gift and estate tax valuation rules. Although most families use
partnerships, limited liability corporations and Subchapter S corporations
can achieve the same result.53 The fair market value of an asset for estate
and gift tax purposes is “the price at which the property would change
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any
compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of
relevant facts.”54 The family limited partnership (FLP) works because of
two factors: (1) parents often want to keep their business in the family and
as such place restrictions on transfer, and (2) an asset with restrictions on
transfer is not worth as much as one without.55
The FLP is usually formed by a parent who transfers most of her property
to the partnership in exchange for limited partnership interests. The general
partner is often a corporation owned by the individual and her children.
The FLP need not be an actual business; many FLPs only contain stocks
and cash. When the parent transfers these partnership interests, they have to
be discounted to reflect a lack of marketability and control.56 For example,
assume that the parent had property worth $10 million. If she did nothing
with this property, she would be liable for tax on the amount over her
lifetime exemption, $4.75 million. If instead she used an FLP to transfer
the property, that $10 million could perhaps be discounted 35 percent
because the interest has restrictions on transfer and it cannot easily be sold
on the market. The property value could then further be reduced by another
discount of 15 percent because the general partner (the corporation owned
by the family) controls all the decisions. Thus, if the interest were to be
sold, the buyer would have no control of the partnership. After these
discounts, the $10 million property would be valued at $5.525 million, and
taxes would only be due on $275,000.
Although these illogical discounts are based solely on arbitrary form
changing, this technique has been used for over two decades.57 At first the
IRS contended that the separate interests in the FLP should be aggregated
for valuation purposes, but it eventually abandoned this position.58 The IRS
52. See, e.g., Drake, supra note 45, at 191.
53. Subchapter C corporations are avoided because they are taxed at the entity level.
I.R.C. § 11.
54. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1965).
55. See Drake, supra note 45, at 191, 199–200.
56. See Courtney Lieb, Comment, The IRS Wages War on the Family Limited
Partnership: How to Establish a Family Limited Partnership That Will Withstand Attack, 71
UMKC L. REV. 887, 893 (2003).
57. See Kenneth P. Brier & Joseph B. Darby III, Family Limited Partnerships:
Decanting Family Investment Assets into New Bottles, 49 TAX LAW. 127, 127 (1995)
(“However, in recent years, a series of successful estate tax valuation cases, coupled with
formal concessions by the Service on some key legal issues, have created an incentive for
taxpayers to broaden the uses of FLPs. In turn, these incentives have raised the question of
how far taxpayers can go in utilizing the FLP for gift and estate planning purposes,
particularly as a new bottle into which to decant other types of family investment assets.”).
58. Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202.

2436

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

closely scrutinizes FLPs, but taxpayers generally have been successful in
court.59
II. JUDICIAL BASE EROSION
OF THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX
Since the compromise reflected in the American Taxpayer Relief Act of
2012 was reached at the start of 2013, no legislation modifying the federal
estate tax has been enacted. This suggests that the legislative and executive
branches have reached an impasse that preserves the status quo. This part
shows that despite the lack of new laws, estate tax loopholes continue to
grow because erosion of the estate tax base has been accelerated by judges.
As I will discuss later in this Article, the narrative of the estate tax as a limit
on the freedom of disposition has been entrenched further by court
decisions.
A. From Graegin to Keller:
Estate Tax Advantages in Illiquidity
The estate tax advantages of loans incurred by an illiquid estate to
finance estate tax obligations can be considerable. A noticeable shift in the
judicial permissiveness of this technique can be tracked by looking at three
cases:
Estate of Graegin v. Commissioner,60 Estate of Black v.
Commissioner,61 and Keller v. United States.62 The first case was decided
before the estate tax battles of the 1990s and early 2000s. The latter two
cases were decided during the more recent period of increasing exemptions
and arguably increased judicial deference to freedom of disposition.
In Graegin, the decedent’s probate estate possessed only $20,000 of
liquid assets from which to satisfy an estate tax liability of over $200,000.63
A trust established by the decedent held the preferred stock in a closely held
corporation, the common stock of which was largely owned by the
decedent’s son (who also served as the corporation’s president).64 To avoid
selling the preferred stock, the estate (of which the decedent’s son served as
coexecutor) borrowed the $200,000 estate tax liability from the
corporation.65 In one sense, the decedent’s son was on both sides of the
transaction. In a more formalistic sense, the parties (the estate and the
corporation) structured the loan as an unsecured fifteen-year balloon

59. See, e.g., Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 268–69 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding
that there were significant nontax motives to form the FLP, including the desire to retain
assets in a single well-managed entity).
60. 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 387 (1988).
61. 133 T.C. 340 (2009).
62. 697 F.3d 238 (5th Cir. 2012).
63. Graegin, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) at 389.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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obligation, calling for interest at 15 percent per year.66 The note prohibited
prepayment of interest and principal.67
The estate claimed a deduction for the full, undiscounted value of the
interest payment (approximately $450,000) due at the conclusion of the
fifteen-year note term.68 The Tax Court sustained the deduction against the
IRS’s challenge, finding the loan was incurred by the estate necessarily to
avoid the forced sale of illiquid assets and finding the arrangement to
constitute a genuine loan (despite admittedly being “disturbed” by the
single payment of interest and principal).69 Note that what is now called
the Graegin loan technique will produce considerable estate tax savings
even when the estate tax and income tax rates are equivalent. Because the
estate was able to currently deduct a future payment of interest, the current
estate tax savings will necessarily outweigh the future income tax cost (with
such savings increasing with the term of the loan).
The Service continued to challenge the Graegin loan technique, which
subsequently was pursued in connection with FLP planning. For instance,
in Estate of Black, the decedent’s estate borrowed $71 million from an FLP
in which the decedent held an interest.70 The Tax Court determined that, as
a practical matter, the estate depended on a distribution from the partnership
to satisfy its obligations under the loan:
The loan structure, in effect, constituted an indirect use of . . . stock
[owned by the partnership] to pay the debts of [the decedent’s] estate and
accomplished nothing more than a direct use of that stock for the same
purpose would have accomplished, except for the substantial estate tax
savings.71

Accordingly, the court upheld the IRS Commissioner’s denial of the
deduction for interest paid under the loan.72
However, not all courts are as exacting in their scrutiny of Graegin loans.
For instance, in Keller, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
distinguished Estate of Black and approved an interest deduction under
fairly extreme circumstances.73 Following the death of her husband, the
decedent in Keller began exploring plans to establish an FLP to be funded
with approximately $300 million of cash, certificates of deposit, and
bonds.74 Two family trusts were to hold the limited partnership interests,
and an LLC was to be formed to hold the general partnership interests.75
The decedent executed the documents forming the limited partnership and
LLC and then died a few days later.76 The expected capital contributions
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 390.
Id. at 390–91.
Estate of Black v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. 340, 358 (2009).
Id. at 385.
Id.
Keller v. United States, 697 F.3d 238, 247–48 (5th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 240.
Id.
Id. at 240–41.
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were described in contemporaneously produced notes and spreadsheets, but
the decedent died before the assets were actually transferred to the
partnership.77 Acting on the advice of its accountant, who believed that the
formation and funding of the limited partnership had been ineffective, the
estate paid over $147 million in estate taxes.78 But the accountant later
reconsidered this position after attending a continuing legal education
seminar.79
Roughly a year after the decedent’s death, the estate completed the
funding of the partnership.80 The estate then pursued a refund of a
significant portion of the estate tax liability, with the refund based primarily
on valuation discounts attributable to the partnership interests.81 In addition
to funding the partnership, the estate retroactively restructured its earlier
estate tax payment as a loan from the partnership to the estate, followed by
the estate’s payment of taxes.82 The estate issued a backdated promissory
note to memorialize the restructured transaction.83 Accordingly, the estate
claimed a deduction for interest payments on the restructured loan, and this
deduction served as an additional basis for the refund claim.84
The Government argued that the circumstances in Keller were essentially
the same as those in Estate of Black and that the Fifth Circuit therefore
should deny the interest deduction.85 The Fifth Circuit disagreed,
distinguishing Estate of Black on the basis that partnership assets were the
only assets in that case that could have been used to make the loan
By contrast, the estate in Keller included additional
payments.86
nonpartnership assets, which (in theory at least) could have been liquidated
to finance the loan payments.87 For this reason, the court rejected the
Government’s argument that the tax payment should have been
characterized as a partnership distribution.88 The court apparently was not
persuaded by the fact that the assets used to make the tax payment were, in
fact, the same assets that the court also held had been transferred to the
partnership.
Ironically, one of the bases for allowing the interest deduction was that
the estate was largely illiquid, as the estate’s nonpartnership assets
consisted of ranch and mineral holdings.89 Of course, the decedent died
holding primarily liquid assets—i.e., the $300 million of cash, certificates
of deposit, and bonds—and these assets were in fact liquidated to satisfy the
estate tax liability. Nonetheless, the court considered the estate to be
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 241.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 247.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 247–48.
Id. at 247.
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illiquid and thus entitled to the interest deduction because the liquid assets
were beneficially owned by the partnership as of the decedent’s death.90
B. From Procter to Wandry:
The Evolution of Conditions Subsequent
The evolution in the conditions subsequent cases is even more troubling
in its scope. Successful use of this technique prevents the Service from
making meaningful adjustments on audited returns.
In Commissioner v. Procter,91 the taxpayer possessed remainder interests
in two trusts that were to become possessory on his mother’s death. He
assigned these remainder interests to a separate trust, which obligated the
trustees to use trust property to satisfy the balance due on loans to the
taxpayer by the taxpayer’s mother.92 The taxpayer retained an income
interest in any funds that remained after repayment of the loans, and the
principal of the trust was to be distributed to the taxpayer’s children on his
death.93
In an attempt to insulate the transfer from gift tax consequences, the
taxpayer inserted a savings clause into the transfer document.94 This
provision instructed that, in the event of a final order or judgment
determining that any portion of the transfer constituted a gift, that portion of
the property would “automatically be deemed not to be included in the
conveyance in trust hereunder and shall remain the sole property of [the
taxpayer].”95 The Fourth Circuit refused to enforce this provision on policy
grounds:
This is clearly a condition subsequent and void because contrary to public
policy. A contrary holding would mean that upon a decision that the gift
was subject to tax, the court making such decision must hold it not a gift
and therefore not subject to tax. . . . It is manifest that a condition which
involves this sort of trifling with the judicial process cannot be
sustained.96

The court justified its holding on three grounds: (1) the provision had a
tendency to discourage the collection of tax; (2) the condition would
obstruct the administration of justice by forcing courts to pass on a moot
issue; and (3) the condition itself was illogical—a final order of judgment
of a tax liability could not be reversed by a subsequent transfer.97
90. Id. at 248.
91. 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944).
92. Id. at 825.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 827.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 827–28. The Service in Revenue Ruling 86-41, 1986-1 C.B. 300, provided
examples of two other provisions that it viewed as unenforceable under the Procter doctrine.
Id. The first example consisted of a conveyance of an undivided fractional interest in real
property with an adjustment clause providing the following: if the value of the conveyance
exceeded the prevailing annual exclusion amount, then the fractional amount of the
conveyed property would be reduced so that the value of the gift would be fully shielded by
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Procter has come to stand for the proposition that conditions subsequent
to the initial gratuitous transfer that are introduced for the purpose of
avoiding the imposition of the gift tax violate public policy.
More than fifty years later, with savings clauses or other conditions
subsequent unenforceable under Procter and its progeny, taxpayers recently
have turned their sights to so-called defined value transfer clauses as a way
of avoiding the conditions subsequent label while achieving a similar result.
The first case that tested this taxpayer strategy was McCord v.
Commissioner.98 In McCord, a husband and wife made irrevocable
transfers of all of their limited partnership interests in a family-owned
partnership to four donees, two of which were tax-exempt entities.99
Importantly, the assignment agreement did not specify the respective
percentages of partnership interests that were to be transferred to each
donee.100 Instead, the assignment agreement specified only the fair market
value of partnership interests that each donee was to receive.101
The assignment agreement instructed that the assigned partnership
interests be allocated among the donees in the following cascading order:
(1) generation skipping transfer (GST) trusts were to receive partnership
interests equal to the amount of the taxpayers’ remaining GST tax
exemption; (2) the taxpayers’ sons were to receive partnership interests
worth approximately $7 million, reduced by the value of the interests
conveyed to the GST trusts under the first allocation; (3) a nonprofit
symphony was to receive the lesser of $134,000 worth of partnership
interests or the amount of any partnership interests that remained after the
first two allocations; and (4) a tax-exempt community foundation was to
receive the value of any partnership interests not allocated under the prior
provisions.102 The taxpayers retained no control over how the assigned
partnership interests would be allocated among the donees.103 Rather, the
donees made this determination several months after the assignment by
having the assigned partnership interests appraised and allocating those
interests with the defined-value instructions.104 Only at this point were the
precise percentage partnership interests that were transferred to each donee
established.105 A few months after the donees executed the confirmation
agreement, the partnership redeemed the limited partnership interests held
by the tax-exempt organizations.106

the exclusion amount. Id. The second example achieved the same result, albeit through a
different route. Instead of reducing the portion of the conveyed property in hindsight, the
transfer obligated the transferee to return each dollar to the transferor. Id.
98. 120 T.C. 358 (2003), rev’d, 461 F.3d 614 (5th Cir. 2006).
99. Id. at 364.
100. Id. at 365.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 364–65.
103. Id. at 365–66.
104. Id. at 366.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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The taxpayers reported the value of their gifts based on the per-unit value
reflected in the appraisal, which incorporated a variety of entity-related
valuation discounts.107 The Service determined that the per-unit value of
the assigned partnership interests was almost double the amount claimed by
the taxpayers and therefore increased the value of the gifts to the GST trusts
and to the taxpayers’ sons.108 The taxpayers, however, were not
particularly concerned with the Service’s valuation objection.109 They
argued that, pursuant to the formula clause in the assignment agreement, the
Service’s increased valuation of the assigned partnership interests simply
meant that more of the partnership interests should have been allocated to
the tax-exempt community foundation as the residual value had done.110
This adjustment would have produced no additional revenue; the increased
gift to the community foundation would have been offset by an increased
charitable deduction.111 The Service, in turn, responded that any transfer
that systematically protected a revaluation of the transferred property from
generating additional tax revenue was void on public policy grounds.112
The Tax Court issued a divided opinion in the case. The majority
opinion approached the matter by starting with the percentage partnership
interests that ultimately were received by each donee—in effect, treating the
taxpayers’ assignment agreement and the donees’ confirmation agreement
as components of a single transaction.113 The majority first determined the
proper per-unit value of the assigned partnership interests through a
painstaking analysis.114 Then, to determine the gift tax consequence, they
applied the proper per-unit value to the percentage partnership interests that
actually were received by the donees.115 The majority refused to treat the
revaluation of the partnership interests as allocating additional interests to
the tax-exempt foundation, noting that the community foundation was not
entitled to an additional share of the transferred partnership interests under
state law.116 Having undermined the taxpayers’ attempt to bulletproof the
gift from valuation challenge in this manner, the majority did not need to
address the public policy challenge. However, other judges of the Tax
Court would have utilized the public policy doctrine articulated in Procter
and Ward to deny any increase in the charitable deduction for amounts the
charitable organizations would never receive.117
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the Government dropped its public policy
argument and, instead, advanced the theory endorsed by the Tax Court
107. Id. at 367–68. See generally supra Part I.B.
108. McCord, 120 T.C. at 368.
109. Id. at 369.
110. Id.
111. Id. Keep in mind, however, that the percentage partnership interest received by the
foundation was set by the donees’ confirmation agreement and that the foundation’s interest
was redeemed shortly thereafter. Id. at 365–66.
112. Id. at 369.
113. Id. at 396–97.
114. Id. at 398.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 406.
117. Id. at 427–30 (Laro, J., dissenting).
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majority. In a fairly indignant opinion, the Fifth Circuit emphatically
reversed in the taxpayers’ favor.118 As reflected below, the Fifth Circuit
disapproved of the majority’s consideration of the manner in which the
donees allocated the percentage partnership interests among themselves:
It is clear beyond cavil that the Majority should have stopped with the
Assignment Agreement’s plain wording. By not doing so, however, and
instead continuing on to the post-gift Confirmation Agreement’s intradonee concurrence on the equivalency of dollars to percentage of interests
in [the partnership], the Majority violated the firmly-established maxim
that a gift is valued as of the date that it is complete; the flip side of that
maxim is that subsequent occurrences are off limits.119

Without explaining how the property interests transferred to each donee
could be determined without reference to the donees’ confirmation
agreement, the Fifth Circuit viewed the transfer of value that occurred under
the assignment agreement as completing the gift.120 Accordingly, any
increase in the per-unit valuation of the partnership interests could not
increase the taxpayers’ gift tax liability.121
Defined-value transfers understandably have become quite popular in the
estate-planning community since the Fifth Circuit’s reversal in McCord.
Although the appellate court in McCord did not address challenges to
defined-value transfers based on Procter-like public policy objections—
because the Government did not advance these arguments on appeal—the
Tax Court’s subsequent decision in Estate of Petter v. Commissioner122 has
mitigated any lingering public policy concerns.
The taxpayer in Petter first transferred stock in United Parcel Service to
an LLC and then made gratuitous assignments of LLC units.123 Each
assignment concerned a specified number of LLC units, with a defined
value being transferred to an irrevocable trust and the remaining value
passing to community foundations.124 The transfer agreements provided
that if the value of the units transferred to the trust, as finally determined for
gift tax purposes, exceeded the amount of the defined value transfers, the
trust would make corrective transfers of LLC units to the charitable
beneficiary.125 The IRS challenged the per-unit value of the transferred
LLC interests and further argued that any purported reallocation of units
from the trust to the charitable beneficiary should be disregarded under
Procter as a subsequent transfer.126 The Tax Court disagreed, finding that
the taxpayer’s transfer was one of a formula amount instead of an absolute

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

McCord v. Comm’r, 461 F.3d 614, 632 (5th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 626.
Id. at 627.
Id. at 628.
98 T.C.M. (CCH) 534 (2009), aff’d, 653 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 535.
Id. at 536.
Id. at 536–37.
Id. at 539.
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number of LLC units.127 The court found this distinction meaningful,
noting that “savings clauses are void, but formula clauses are fine.”128
In addition to distinguishing the Procter decision, the Tax Court went on
to dismiss other public policy arguments against the technique, noting that a
redetermination of the value of the transferred parties would have economic
consequences to the transferees and relying on the fiduciary obligations of
the charitable organizations to enforce their rights under the gift
agreements.129 In short, the Tax Court was not willing to treat the charities
as serving a mere accommodation role in the taxpayer’s estate planning.
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the Service dropped its Procter argument,
arguing instead that the adjustment feature of the defined-value clauses
subjected a portion of the gift to the charity (the corrective transfers) to a
condition precedent—an IRS audit—in violation of Treasury Regulation
section 25.2522(c)-3(b)(1).130 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument,
distinguishing true conditional gifts—if, for example, a portion would pass
to charity only in the event of an audit—from formula gifts, in which the
number of units received by the charity is predetermined but not
ascertainable until per-unit values finally are determined.131 According to
the court, the corrective transfers to the charity were not dependent on an
IRS audit; rather, the IRS audit simply resolved an open question as to how
many units the charity was entitled to receive, that number being fixed
(though unknown) as of the date of the original assignments.132 The Ninth
Circuit pointed out that the IRS was not the only party that could have
challenged the per-unit value.133 Either the trust or the charity could have
challenged the valuation as well (and thereby potentially triggered
corrective transfers), though the court acknowledged that neither party was
likely to do so.134
In Wandry v. Commissioner,135 the Tax Court approved a substantially
more aggressive planning technique: the use of a defined-value clause
without a charitable component.136 In Wandry, a husband and wife formed
an LLC with their four children.137 On January 1, 2004, when the gift tax
exemption equivalent was $1,000,000 and the annual exclusion was
$11,000, each of the taxpayers executed an assignment of “a sufficient
number of my [LLC membership units] so that the fair market value of such
Units for federal gift tax purposes shall be [$261,000 for each assignment to

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 542.
Id.
Id. at 542–43.
Estate of Petter v. Comm’r, 653 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1018–20.
Id. at 1020.
Id. at 1019.
Id.
103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1472 (2011).
Id. at 1478–79.
Id. at 1473.
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a child and $11,000 for each assignment to a grandchild].”138
assignment further provided:

The

Although the number of Units gifted is fixed on the date of the gift, that
number is based on the fair market value of the gifted Units, which cannot
be known on the date of the gift but must be determined after such date
based on all relevant information as of that date.139

The assignment also stated:
[I]f, after the number of gifted Units is determined based on [an
appraisal], the IRS challenges such valuation and a final determination of
a different value is made by the IRS or a court of law, the number of
gifted Units shall be adjusted . . . so that the value of the number of Units
gifted to each person equals the amount set forth above, in the same
manner as a federal estate tax formula marital deduction amount would be
adjusted for a valuation redetermination by the IRS and/or a court of
law.140

The Service argued that the case should be controlled by Procter on the
theory that the assignment instrument allowed taxpayers to “take property
back” on the happening of a condition subsequent—that is, an adjustment in
value of the gift tax units for gift tax purposes.141 Relying in significant
part on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Petter, the court interpreted the
assignments as transferring a predetermined number of LLC units, even
though the exact number of units would not be known until the date on
which the per-unit gift tax value finally was determined.142 In the view of
the Tax Court, both before and after the IRS audit, the children and
grandchildren were entitled to receive the same number of units, and thus
the assignments would not be viewed as creating an impermissible
condition subsequent of the type found invalid in Procter.143
The Tax Court refused to distinguish Petter on the basis that it involved
charitable beneficiaries or that, in Petter, the adjustment clause affected
only the relative shares of the donees and not the amounts transmitted by
the taxpayer: “It is inconsequential that the adjustment clause reallocates
membership units among [taxpayers] and the donees rather than a charitable
organization because the reallocations do not alter the transfers.”144 The
Tax Court was also apparently unconcerned that the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning in Petter was based in substantial part on Treasury Regulation
section 25.2522(c)-3(b)(1), which was obviously of no direct relevance in
the Wandry case.145 Although the congressional policy of encouraging
charitable gifts may have influenced the result in Petter, the Tax Court

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
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Id. at 1473–74.
Id. at 1474.
Id. at 1477.
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concluded that this factor was not outcome determinative.146 Furthermore,
the court determined that the absence of a charitable donee in the Wandry
transaction did not raise additional public policy concerns.147 Although the
Government’s appeal of the Wandry decision was subsequently dismissed
by stipulation, the Service issued a nonacquiescence to the decision.148
The Wandry decision is important because it starkly reveals a historical
shift in the way courts analyze estate planning techniques. Although the
conditions subsequent and the illiquidity cases have been discussed
separately, there is a historical thread tying them together. The Procter
Court’s broad and substantive public policy holding can be seen as
grounded in a historical understanding that administering a tax system
sometimes requires looking beyond the form of a transaction.149 A
taxpayer can structure her affairs in a way that meets the letter of the law,
but tax benefits can still be denied by a court after viewing the transaction
as a whole.
The McCord, Petter, and Wandry Courts represent a rejection of this
principle in favor of estate tax formalism. With increased focus on the
details of the taxpayer transaction, the overall thrust of the tax avoidance
has been subsumed. The next part of this Article argues that this formalism
has been spurred by, and in turn has entrenched, a narrative of the estate tax
as a limit on liberty and the freedom of disposition.
III. PROPOSALS TO “FIX” THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX
AND THE LESSONS OF PSYCHOLOGY
For those worried about the current state of our wealth transfer system,
all is not lost. The estate tax still brings in revenue that our fiscally
imbalanced nation needs. As proponents have noted, the revenues
generated from the estate tax between 2016 through 2025 would be enough
to fund the Food and Drug Administration, the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, and the Environmental Protection Agency.150
The proliferation of loopholes is not intractable, as there have been
several proposals to increase the revenue potential and efficacy of the
federal estate tax. This part briefly covers the details of some representative
proposals. It acknowledges their potential efficacy but argues that their
reliance on facts ignores the importance of stories in human decision

146. Id. at 1477–78.
147. Id. at 1478.
148. See 2012-46 I.R.B. 542.
149. As explained by Judge Learned Hand, “[T]he meaning of a sentence may be more
than that of the separate words, as a melody is more than the notes, and no degree of
particularity can ever obviate recourse to the setting in which all appear, and which all
collectively create.” Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810–11 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293
U.S. 465 (1935).
150. Chye-Ching Huang & Brandon Debot, Ten Facts You Should Know About the
Federal Estate Tax, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITES (Mar. 23, 2015),
http://www.cbpp.org/research/ten-facts-you-should-know-about-the-federal-estate-tax [https:
//perma.cc/E5MB-T5V9].
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making. I then introduce System Justification Theory to show how these
estate tax stories became entrenched narratives.
A. Proposals: Executive, Legislative, and Academic
The Obama Administration’s budget proposals for fiscal years 2014
through 2016 would put pre-2009 estate tax exemptions and tax rates back
into place, but would retain the present portability rules for spouses.151 The
exemption amount would be $3.5 million for estate and generation-skipping
transfer tax purposes and $1 million for gift tax purposes, with neither
amount indexed for inflation.152 The top estate and gift tax rate would be
45 percent.153
On the legislative front, Representative Jim McDermott introduced a
more ambitious proposal to amend the estate tax in 2014. The Sensible
Estate Tax Act of 2014 would modify the wealth transfer tax rules by
reducing the exemption amount and increasing the applicable tax rates.154
The bill would reduce the exemption amount for estate, gift, and
generation-skipping transfer tax purposes to $1 million, indexed for post2000 inflation.155 The bill also would increase the top marginal tax rate to
55 percent and provide for inflation indexing of the rate bracket cut-off
points.156
Academics also have widely addressed estate and gift tax reform, and
there have been numerous proposals to improve the estate tax.
Representative examples include proposals from Paul Caron and James
Repetti and from Edward McCaffery.
Paul Caron and James Repetti have advanced a number of estate and gift
tax reform proposals, which they argue would generate needed revenue,
reduce inequality, and contribute to economic growth. One proposed
solution is returning to the $3.5 million exemption and increasing the
maximum rate to 45 percent—similar to the Obama proposal—but also
limiting the GST tax exemption to transfers occurring within fifty years.157
Additionally, they recommend eliminating minority discounts in certain
circumstances.158 Next, they suggest maintaining parity between the estate
and gift tax unified credit.159 They also advance restricting the ability of

151. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S
FISCAL YEAR 2016 REVENUE PROPOSALS 193–94 (2015), https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ENQ9B8CM].
152. Id. at 194.
153. Id.
154. H.R. 4061, 113th Cong. (2014).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, Revitalizing the Estate Tax: 5 Easy Pieces, 142
TAX NOTES 1231, 1235–36 (2014).
158. Id. at 1232–35.
159. Id. at 1235–39.
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gifts made in trust to qualify for the gift tax annual exclusion and, finally,
restricting Grantor Retained Annuity Trusts through a lifetime cap.160
According to Edward McCaffery, it is unlikely that the estate tax will
become more meaningful in the foreseeable future, but it is also unlikely
that it will be repealed.161 McCaffery argues that the battle over the estate
tax has distracted us from the advantages that stepped-up basis162
provides.163 Instead of focusing on increasing the rates or lowering the
exemption, McCaffery would change the section 1014 basis rules that allow
for stepped-up basis.164 McCaffery suggests that such a move would
eliminate certain kinds of tax planning and lessen wealth concentrations
more effectively.165
B. Stories Trump Science
While the above proposals are reasonable alternatives to the status quo,
they do little to confront the unpopularity of the estate tax. “Stories Trump
Science,” the twentieth chapter of the Graetz and Shapiro account of the
estate tax battles, states:
Like Kerry, Dukakis, and Dewey before them, the opponents of estate tax
repeal failed to grasp that in politics, science is never enough. By
expecting science to sway political opinion, the repeal opponents let the
ball get away from them. While the Democrats snoozed, their opponents
transformed one major tax policy—the levy on inheritances—from a
radical fringe reform to an apparently populist demand to repeal an
“immoral” tax.166

Graetz and Shapiro go to substantial lengths in their book to show that the
success of the death tax repeal movement was not just the result of money
and behind-the-scenes lobbying. Rather, estate tax abolitionists understood
that tax policy is more about ideology than facts. The repeal movement let
the wealthy stay in the background and relied on the stories of farmers and
small business owners to convince Americans that the estate tax was
unfair.167
This argument about narrative explicitly relies on psychological insights
and, more specifically, on the work of Jerome Bruner, a cognitive
psychologist.168 In his influential book, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds,169
Bruner argued that cognitive science to that point had been too narrowly
160. Id. at 1239–40.
161. Edward J. McCaffery, Distracted from Distraction by Distraction: Reimagining
Estate Tax Reform, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1235, 1236 (2013).
162. As currently structured, untaxed appreciation in property disappears at death and is
not taxed. Pursuant to IRC section 1014(a), someone who inherits property receives a basis
equal to the fair market value on the date of the decedent’s death.
163. McCaffery, supra note 161, at 1237.
164. Id. at 1250–52.
165. Id. at 1252–53.
166. GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 226.
167. Id. at 230.
168. Id.
169. JEROME BRUNER, ACTUAL MINDS, POSSIBLE WORLDS (1986).
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focused on the logical, more scientific aspects of the mind—the
“paradigmatic mode.”170 Bruner underscored the importance of what he
termed the “narrative mode.”171 This part of the mind uses creativity to
make experiences meaningful.172 It appreciates good stories, gripping
drama, primitive myths and rituals, and plausible historical accounts, and it
is not tethered to the facts or science of these accounts.173
As such, the lack of “rightness” in death tax accounts is only of partial
importance. A part of the mind will ultimately be attracted to the meaning
and comfort that stories provide. The story of the farmer forced to sell
property to pay taxes is thus more important than noting that only a handful
of small farms are affected by the estate tax. Bruner’s work suggests that
progressives should focus their energies on countering the estate tax
abolitionist narrative. As Graetz and Shapiro noted, something like “The
Paris Hilton Tax Cut” might be a good start.174
Unfortunately, countering stories with other stories might not be enough.
More recent research suggests that countering the death tax narrative might
be even more complicated as stories become entrenched and tend to be
defended vigorously as part of the status quo.
C. System Justification Theory
and the “Death Tax” Repeal Movement
System Justification Theory (SJT) connects the use of narrative to the
persistence of the status quo and hierarchy in American society. The
theory, first proposed by John Jost and Mahzain Banaji in 1994,175 posits
that there is an underlying human need to support and defend the social
status quo, even among those who are seemingly most disadvantaged by
it.176 SJT explains the contours of this motive and the contexts in which it
operates.177 Similar to the group justification theories, SJT predicts that the
powerful are motivated to preserve their dominant position in society.178
Yet, the support of such policies is not based on group-level ethnocentrism
alone.
Instead, SJT suggests that people can, at least under certain
circumstances, be motivated to justify and defend the existing status quo.179
Such motivation can manifest itself in many different ways. However, in
the realm of group relations, one way that system justification can emerge is
in terms of justifying and defending the existing dominance of the wealthy

170. Id. at 12–14.
171. Id. at 13–14.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 233–35.
175. John T. Jost & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Role of Stereotyping in System-Justification
and the Production of False Consciousness, 33 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (1994).
176. See id. at 10.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
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in society, irrespective of the perceiver’s own group membership.180 This
leads to a counterintuitive prediction, in the sense that even the nonwealthy
would be expected to justify the status quo.181
Support for the system is often manifested in different ways. For
example, stereotypes and stock narratives can help justify systems by
suggesting reasons that capable, smart, and hardworking individuals are at
the top and that dumb, slothful, and irresponsible individuals are at the
bottom. In this way, our current, limited system of wealth taxation reflects
the notion that, contrary to our apparent commitment to equal opportunity,
we value and encourage wealth accumulation.
As Jost and his colleagues are careful to note, membership in a high
versus low status group is not the only determinant of system-justifying
motives.182 In particular, the ideological beliefs of the perceiver also can
play an important role.183 These beliefs are nourished by stories:
Analogies that maintain the basic structure of relationships among the
elements are most easily retrieved and applied. Thus, we find it easier to
analogize from one hierarchical system to another, given that there are
corresponding roles for leaders and followers. Metaphors that map from
one system level to another are quite common: a family (of nations), (it
takes) a village, a (salvation) army, a war on (poverty, drugs, terror).
These frames are powerful both because they bring many implicit
associations and because they activate thoughts about systems that are
themselves the subject of system-justifying motives.184

Individuals do not have to go very far to find ways to justify the status quo
because stereotypes, stories, and ideologies supply easy explanations and
excuses for the system.
System justification does leave room for changing the status quo. It
acknowledges that individuals are parts of multiple, overlapping systems
whose importance varies by time and context.185 The instances in which
the status quo is resisted are the exceptions, unfortunately. More often than
not individuals have a conservative tendency to accept the legitimacy of the
established hierarchy and to perceive existing institutions as basically
reasonable and just until proven otherwise.186
System justification theorists have explicitly connected their insights to
Graetz and Shapiro’s institutional account.187 The success of estate tax
abolitionists was partly a triumph of framing. According to Gary Blasi and
John Jost, estate taxes involve two common systems: (1) the family and

180. See id. at 13.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 14.
183. See generally John T. Jost et al., Political Conservatism As Motivated Social
Cognition, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 339 (2003).
184. Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: Implications
for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1119, 1151 (2006).
185. Id. at 1124.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1154–55.
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(2) the nation.188 Repeal advocates successfully framed the issue as one of
family rather than country. As such, the estate tax was an affront to a
family’s future instead of a guarantor of equal opportunity. Blasi and Jost
suggest that advancing another version of the family frame might have
helped progressives counter repeal efforts.189
With this understanding, the previously discussed jurisprudence, and
more specifically the historical shift between Procter and Wandry, comes
into focus. The courts not only shifted from a substantive to a formalistic
analysis, but from a “nation” frame to a “family” frame. If seen as an issue
of family, then all but the most egregious taxpayer attempts to avoid the tax
can be blessed as legitimate.
CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion underscores some of the challenges for those
who favor reducing wealth inequality, at least partially, through the tax
system. It is not only a matter of economics and facts. It is also, and
possibly more importantly, a battle of narrative. Ceding the rhetorical
ground is unlikely to bring success because it ignores the ways human
minds work. The following is not meant to be an exhaustive discussion of
the options going forward or their permutations, but rather some
suggestions for progressives.
The most obvious area of focus is reframing the death tax narrative. This
could include advertisements with Paris Hilton as suggested by Graetz and
Shapiro. Unfortunately, progressives have displayed an unwillingness to
engage in such framing. Perhaps it is seen as too manipulative, but it is
difficult to fathom a more far-reaching tax without reframing. Even if the
attempt is made, it is not clear that nuanced progressive arguments can be
captured in a simple-system frame. This would involve a sustained effort.
Cognitive psychologist George Lakoff has suggested the frame of a national
membership organization where taxes are the dues.190
Another approach may be to ignore the estate tax, as suggested by
McCaffery. The small size of the tax is one reason, the entrenched family
framed narrative is another. Given the sustained work that would be
required to reframe the tax, it may not be worth the effort. While
McCaffery focused on the stepped-up basis rules, it may be that
progressives should move away from the tax system more generally. For
example, campaign finance has been an area in which wealth inequality
arguments have been used much more forcefully and effectively.191 The
frame of a game played with unequal rules and resources has been
successfully utilized by politicians across the spectrum. Efforts could be
focused on the institutional hurdles in that arena.
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Perhaps surprisingly, I am at least somewhat sympathetic to an approach
that may eventually result in a repeal of the federal estate tax. While I am
committed to a system that lessens wealth inequality, I am increasingly
agnostic about the form taxation takes. Although I would not suggest
repealing the estate tax without getting anything in return, I have no
objection to the estate tax serving as a bargaining chip in broader budget
negotiations. The estate tax might be the most progressive part of the tax
system but the collection of revenue is not a primary concern if we use
spending to maintain the progressivity of the system. An attachment to the
federal estate tax is indeed a distraction if it works to prevent other ways of
reducing wealth disparities.
Ultimately, any successful strategy needs to reclaim the historical battles
and lessons that two centuries of taxation have taught us. While the estate
tax may not be ideal, it is the result of compromises which were difficult to
achieve. If it is repealed, it is doubtful that another levy will take its place
in combating wealth concentrations.

